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Abstract. Sufficiently strong security and privacy mechanisms are prerequisite 
to amass the promising benefits of the IoT technology and to incorporate this 
technology into our daily lives. This paper introduces a novel approach to pri-
vacy in networks, an approach which is especially well matched with the IoT 
characteristics. Our general approach is based on continually changing the iden-
tifying attributes of IoT nodes. In particular, the scheme proposed in this work 
is based on changing the IoT nodes’ IP addresses, and because the changing 
patterns of the IP addresses appear random to a non-intended observer, an ad-
versary is unable to identify the source or destination of a particular transmis-
sion. Thus, packets that carry information generated by a particular node cannot 
be linked together. The scheme offers additional security benefits, including 
DoS mitigation, is relatively easy to implement, and requires no changes to the 
existing networking infrastructure. We discuss the details of the implementation 
of the scheme and evaluate its performance. 
Keywords: Privacy, Anonymity, IoT, Security, IP Address Hopping 
1   Introduction and Motivation 
To amass the promising benefits of the Internet of Things (IoT) technology, a number 
of technical challenges have to be overcome, with security being a major such a chal-
lenge. Without sufficient degree of security and privacy of information, users will not 
adopt this new trend that promises to intimately integrate into their lives. It is general-
ly believed that security of Internet of Things is a significantly more challenging 
problem than the security of today’s Internet. First, the number of devices in the IoT 
increases exponentially and many of these devices will operate unattended, thus more 
time might pass without a successful attack being detected. Moreover, all the malware 
that already exists today in the Internet, become viable threats to the small-print IoT 
devices, incapable of running complex security protection software. Furthermore, a 
successful attack on IoT devices, such as medical devices, baby-monitoring equip-
ment, smart stove, and house alarm systems, creates potential for severe and immedi-
ate danger to their users (e.g., resulting in injury or death), a different type of danger 
than we are used to with typical Internet malware, such as theft of information. 
There have been a number of solutions proposed in the literature that preserve pri-
vacy for IoT networks (e.g., [1] − [3]). However, as Internet transmissions require 
explicit disclosure of source/destination IP addresses, these schemes cannot hide the 
identity of the IoT nodes, thus allowing the adversaries to learn about the IoT nodes 
simply by observing the IP addresses in the packets’ headers. In contrast, our pro-
posed scheme, aims to actively obfuscate the IP address of a node by allowing the IP 
address of the node to change frequently (i.e., “IP address hopping”), thus creating 
uncertainty for adversaries of who is the source/destination of a transmission, while 
still allowing the packets to be correctly routed to the destination within the Internet.  
As an example, consider a hospital facility in which numerous patients are hooked 
up to medical sensing IoT devices (e.g., EKG, SPO2, GSR, BP, temperature, etc), 
together creating an IoT network. The sensors’ readings are continuously acquired, 
packetized, and transmitted to the medical information collection station for pro-
cessing, archival, and possibly alerting medical personnel of emergency care needed. 
Such transmissions, being IP-routed, contain the IP addresses of the source device − 
the IoT sensor of the patient. Typically, such information would also include the iden-
tity of the patient. As all the packets originating from the same IoT device would 
carry the same IP address, an adversary can assemble the medical record of a patient 
by collecting subsequent packets. In other words, the IP addresses create an index that 
links all the transmissions together. 
Another example could be collection of electricity reading from electric meters. 
The importance of privacy of such information is well acknowledged, as it could be 
used by thieves to determine that the house occupants are away and, thus, the house 
may be subject to a burglary. Of course, a series of readings put together would tell 
whether the electricity reading decreased in a particular time period, indicative of the 
occupants being away. Our scheme can preserve the privacy of such information by 
severing the link between the electricity readings, as well as the readings’ link to any 
ID of a residence. 
Using the proposed-here scheme, the IP addresses of subsequent transmissions of 
each IoT device would be changed in some unpredictable (yet deterministic) pattern, 
so that the adversary would not be able to use the IP addresses as a linking index of 
the transmissions. In other words, the adversary will see a massive collection of read-
ings, but will not be able to attribute any reading to a single source (e.g., patient or 
house, in the previous examples). Of course, the receiver would need to generate a 
corresponding sequence of the IP addresses, so that the receiver can properly collect 
together the received information. We further note that, as the pattern of IP addresses 
is unique to a particular device, there is no need to include the encrypted patient’s ID 
in the packets, as the IP address pattern already identifies a particular IoT device to 
the receiver (but not to the adversary). In other words, the IP address pattern serves as 
an ID of the IoT device. Furthermore, an attempt to associate a patient with an IP 
address of his IoT devices would also be fruitless.   
2   The Basics of the Scheme 
The proposed scheme is useful for information privacy protection in a scenario where 
a large number of IoT devices transmit similar monitoring (e.g., telemetry) data. More 
particularly, each transmitted data packet, standing by itself and without association 
with a particular user, would be useless to an attacker, while either (1) collection of 
large amount of data coming from a particular user, or (2) association of the data with 
a particular user, would constitute breach of information privacy. The example of a 
hospital with large number of the same type of medical sensors would correspond to 
such a scenario. Similarly, the example of electric meter information from numerous 
houses in a neighborhood would also present such a scenario. 
The basic setup of our scheme includes three nodes, the IoT node whose infor-
mation privacy we intent to protect, the device that communicates with the IoT node, 
which we refer to as the corresponding node (CN), and a trusted node that controls 
the operation of the scheme, which we refer to as the central node. In a general sce-
nario multiple IoT nodes communicate with multiple corresponding nodes.  
The IP address hopping is achieved by a pseudorandom number generator that is 
embedded in a function referred to here as the Tracking Function (TF). The parame-
ters of the TF are shared by the IoT node and the authorized CNs. (Note that the TF 
itself does not need to be secret) The TF continually generates, what appear to an 
arbitrary observer, random addresses. We emphasize that although the output of the 
TF seems random, the operation of the function is deterministic; i.e., anyone who 
observes the output of the TF, even for a long time, cannot predict its future values; 
but whoever holds the parameters (including the input) of the TF can replicate the 
output deterministically.  
An IoT node uses the random addresses as its actual addresses as they are generat-
ed by the TF. When an authorized CN desires to communicate with the IoT node, 
(authorized CN is in possession of the TF parameters), it uses the valid (i.e., the cur-
rent) address generated by the TF as the destination address of its transmission. Simi-
larly, transmission from the IoT node uses as the source address the currently generat-
ed output based on the TF. The IoT node and the CNs generate the IoT node’s current 
IP address every 𝜁 seconds. Of course, for the scheme to operate properly, some de-
gree of synchronization of the TF at the IoT node and the CNs is required – we dis-
cuss this in more details later.  
The role of the central node is mainly to perform the coordination functions: au-
thenticate the CNs, distribute the TF parameters, and aid in clock synchronization. 
The central node, the IoT nodes, and the CNs do not have to reside on the same net-
work or even be close to each other. We assume here that the IoT node is static and 
does not migrate to a new subnet while the scheme is operating, although the scheme 
could be easily extended to support mobile operation as well. 
Our scheme does not introduce additional header information for its operation and 
it can be incrementally deployed in networks; furthermore, the scheme is compatible 
with IPv6 addressing. There is no change required for the operation of routing and 
switching. The required changes to the IP protocol are mostly in the end nodes (the 
IoT and the CN nodes). If the changes in IP address are sufficiently fast, the scheme 
could also be used for DoS mitigation at the IoT node. 
An alternative scheme would be to implement end-to-end encryption on each of the 
IoT devices’ information flows. Although this would protect the information privacy, 
we suggest here that the IP address hopping provides significant advantages over 
encryption. In what follows, we explain why. 
If end-to-end encryption were to be implemented, it is clear that multiple keys 
(probably one key per an IoT device) would need to be maintained. Therefore, some 
node ID would have to be transmitted in the clear to allow the receiver to choose the 
proper decryption key. (In fact, the IP address could be such a node ID used to choose 
the proper key.) As such, the attacker would be able to associate packets with a par-
ticular ID, risking loss of privacy. On the other hand, in the proposed scheme, no node 
ID needs to be transmitted; indeed, even the IP address of the node cannot be inter-
preted as a node ID, as it is continually changes (even if an attacker is able to associ-
ate an IP address with a particular device, such an association would be very short-
time living with very limiting privacy consequences). Thus, we maintain that, for the 
assumed communication scenario, our scheme provides advantageous information 
privacy scheme, compared with plain encryption.  
Furthermore, the proposed scheme avoids the need to maintain the encryption keys 
and the necessity to periodically rekey the nodes. Finally, the overhead associated 
with encryption/decryption is eliminated too, which is of particular benefit for re-
source-constrained devices.   
2.1   Threat Model 
We assume that an adversary can mount passive attacks, such as network scanning 
and eavesdropping to collect information carried by the packets (including the header 
information), to assemble information from packets, so as to obtain protected infor-
mation sent by the IoT nodes (i.e., violating privacy). An attacker can eavesdrop on 
all connections.  In particular, a passive attacker can obtain the current IP address of 
the IoT node and launch attacks on the IoT node (i.e., becoming an active attacker). 
We assume that network infrastructure is reliable and not malicious; but may impose 
delay and packet loss. We further assume that CNs are not malicious and that the 
central node is a trusted node.  
2.2   The Tracking Function 
In order to generate the IP addresses at the IoT node, we use the timestamp (a se-
quence that is linearly increasing) as the input to a pseudo-random number generator 
(PRNG). The timestamp of the IoT node is one of the parameters that is kept secret in 
our scheme and is in the possession of the secret-sharing nodes. The PRNG, on the 
other hand, is publicly known; however, without knowing the timestamp and the other 
parameters the output is unpredictable. In general, any hash function that satisfies the 
following characteristics, can be used as the scheme’s PRNG: 
•   The function must be one-way secure, meaning that by watching the past values, 
one cannot guess the parameters of the function. 
•   The function must be unpredictable; meaning that by watching past values, one 
cannot predict any future values of the function. 
•   The function outputs should be randomly distributed on any time scale (at least on 
a sufficiently long time scale).  
The IP address of IoT node is generated by feeding the timestamp to the Tracking 
Function, which is based on PRNG as follows:  
 𝐼𝑃 = 𝑇𝐹 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝 = 𝐵𝐴 + 𝐻2 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝  , (1) 
where TF denotes the Tracking Function, 𝐵𝐴 represents the base address of the IoT 
node’s subnet (e.g. ‘129.110.242.0’ without ‘/24’), and 𝐻2 denotes using 𝑥 least sig-
nificant bit of the output of the PRNG. 𝑥 is the minimum number of bits that is re-
quired for representing all the available addresses in the IoT node’s subnet (𝐵𝐴 and 𝑥 
can be calculated from the IoT node’s subnet address).  
We propose to use a chaotic function as the PRNG. In general, chaotic functions 
are highly sensitive to initial conditions and control parameters, and they appear to 
behave randomly, alas they are completely deterministic once the set of control pa-
rameters is known. A slight change in the input will result in a big change in the out-
put. This property fits well with the goals of the PRNG. More specifically, we use the 
Hash Function Based on Chaotic Tent Maps as the PRNG of the scheme ([4]), since it 
has the aforementioned characteristic. By using the hash function based on a chaotic 
function, a third-party can neither predict the future values by watching the function, 
nor generate the function without having the control parameters.  
The following is a simple example that demonstrates the operation of the Tracking 
Function. We further assume that we are using IPv4 addressing scheme and that the 
network address of IoT is 129.110.242.0/24. We need at least 8 bits to represent the 
host ID portion of the IP address (𝑥 = 8). Table 1 shows the corresponding generated 
IP addresses.  
Table 1. Output of the Tracking Function for 6 samples of timestamp 
Time-stamp 8 least significant bits of PRNG output Tracking Function output 
Binary Decimal 
3000000 10000111 135 129.110.242.135 
3000001 00010100 20 129.110.242.20 
3000002 11101100 236 129.110.242.236 
3000003 11111100 252 129.110.242.252 
3000004 00101010 42 129.110.242.42 
3000005 00010010 18 129.110.242.18 
 
Basically, the hash function based on the chaotic tent maps takes in an arbitrary 
length input 𝑀 and produces a 2𝑙-bit hash output, where 𝑙 is the blocks’ size into 
which the message 𝑀 is broken. 𝑛 is the number of rounds in the function. If 𝑀 < 𝑙, 
the block is padded so that the size of the message is a multiple of 𝑙. In our scheme, 
the hash function takes in the timestamp as the input M and a pair of initial binary 
fractions (𝑠;, 𝑡;), producing a hash output that is a 2𝑙-bit binary number. Yet we only 
use the required number of bits (𝑥) that is needed to represent all the available IP 
addresses in a subnet. The initial parameters 𝑠;, 𝑡; 	  could be chosen in different 
ways, but for a good perturbation we use here (𝑠;, 𝑡;) = (0.1010…10, 0.0101…01). In 
[4], the author showed that the hash function is resistant to target attack, free-start 
target attack, collision attack, semi-free-start collision attack, and free-start collision 
attack, as the computational complexity of these attacks are 2?, 2?, 2?/A, 2?/A, 2?/A 
respectively. 
After successful authentication with the central node, authorized CNs get the pa-
rameters of the Tracking Function from the central node. The parameters are: 
timestamp, 𝜁, 𝑙, and subnet address of the IoT node.  
2.3   Clock Synchronization  
As discussed below, some degree of clock synchronization is required in the scheme 
to guarantee that timestamps of the central node, the CNs, and the IoT nodes are syn-
chronized. Clock synchronization algorithms sync two or more clocks that have a 
non-zero drift rate. Typically, drift rate is a very small number; but due to the high 
frequency of clocks, this can lead to a large difference in clocks even after a short 
while. The timestamp that we use in our solution, however, is different from the local 
clock of the operating system. The timestamp that we use is a number that increases 
by one every 𝜁 seconds. The central node, after authenticating the CN, performs 
coarse clock synchronization with the CN, before sending the Tracking Function 
control parameters to the CN. Note that all the nodes (central node, IoT node, and 
CN), perform clock synchronization periodically.  
Let us assume that 𝜂 is the number of times that an IP address changes in each 
clock synchronization period 𝜏; i.e., 𝜏 = 𝜁×	  𝜂, where 𝜂 is a parameter that reflects the 
accuracy of the clocks in use and is calculated based on the maximum drift rate as 
follows. Assume that the maximum drift rate in the system is defined by 𝛿 [sec/sec]. 
Usually 𝛿 is a small number (e.g., 10HI). The maximum skew between the clocks in 
the system after 1 second would be 2×𝛿 [sec]. We know that timestamp increases by 
one every 𝜁 seconds. The maximum skew between two timestamps should be always 
kept less than one within the interval of clock synchronization (every 𝜏 seconds). This 
way the timestamps will always be equal, since they are integer numbers. Let 𝑆 de-
note the skew between the timestamps within 𝜏 seconds; thus we require that 𝑆 < 1: 
 𝑆 = 2×𝛿×1 𝜁 ×𝜏	   = 	  2×𝛿	  ×𝜂 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   𝜂 < 	   K(A×L) (2) 
There are many clock synchronization solutions in the literature that can be used for 
our scheme (e.g., [5],[6]). For instance, Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a low-cost 
solution whose accuracy ranges from hundreds of microseconds to several millisec-
onds ([7]). The reference [8] presents a precise relative clock synchronization proto-
col for distributed applications. It achieves clock precision on the order of 10 micro-
seconds in small-scale LANs and sub-millisecond over LANs. For our experiment 
(Section 4), we implemented an NTP-like clock synchronization program, where the 
central node is an NTP server and the other nodes in the system synchronize their 
clock with it.  
3   Performance Issues 
3.1   Address Collision 
If many IoT nodes in a subnet use the IP hopping scheme, there is a probability that, 
at some point in time, two (or more) nodes will be assigned the same IP address. This, 
of course, is an undesirable situation that should be avoided. In this section, we esti-
mate the probability of such an address collision. 
Suppose that, in a particular subnet, there are 𝑘 + ℎ nodes, 𝑘 of which are IoT 
nodes and ℎ are other non-IoT nodes (e.g., assigned permanent IP addresses). Further, 
assume that 𝑚 is the total number of available IP addresses in the subnet. Then, the 
probability that two or more IoT nodes will be randomly assigned the same IP address 
(i.e., the probability of address collision) is: 
 𝑝 = 1 − (PHQ)× PHQHK ×…×(PHQHSTK)PU  (3) 
We assumed that each IP address can be assigned by the Tracking Function with 
equal probability of 1/𝑚, because the Tracking Function is technically based on a 
pseudo-random number generator, thus the probability of all possible outputs is equal 
([4]). The author in [4] maintains that for any 0	   ≤ 𝛼 < 1, the distribution of 𝑥K =𝐺Y(𝑥;), which is the core of the Hash Function based on Chaotic Tent Maps, for ran-
domly chosen  0	   < 𝑥; < 1  is the standard uniform distribution, 𝒰(0,1). 
 
Fig. 1. Address collision probability as a function of address range, 𝑚, with 𝑘 IoT nodes. 
Fig. 1 shows the address collision probability as a function of the address space size, 𝑚, for different values of 𝑘 and ℎ (ℎ + 𝑘 < 𝑚 < 256). As shown in the figure, when 
there are only IoT nodes in the subnet (i.e., ℎ = 0), the address collision probability 
for network sizes of 𝑚 > 40 is negligibly small. When there are 5 normal nodes (ℎ =5) in addition to the active IoT nodes, the address collision probability is not negligi-
ble anymore. This provides guidance to the design process of such IoT subnets. 
3.2   Packets in Transit 
As discussed before, due to clock mis-synchronization and intrinsic network delays, 
packets arriving after a change in IP address has occurred at the IoT node, may still 
carry the old IP address of the IoT node and, thus, may be discarded at the destination. 
A mechanism is needed that will prevent or at least minimize the loss of packets in 
transit during the changes of network addresses. In the approach that we propose here, 
the IoT node continues to maintain the old IP address (together with the new one) for 
a short while, so that packets arriving with the old IP address after the IP address has 
already changed will still be accepted. Of course, the duration of time when both IP 
addresses are in use should be short to achieve higher privacy in IoT node, as well as 
to reduce the probability of address collision. 
 
Fig. 2.  Address Possible packet loss due to mismatch of IP addresses. Upper graph: IP address 
at the IoT node; lower graph: IP address of packets arriving at the IoT node. 
The timing diagram explaining the scheme’s operation is presented in Fig. 2. In the 
upper portion of the diagram presented are the assignments of the IP addresses to the 
IoT node as a function of time. As we can observe, initially, the IP address of 𝐼𝑃K is 
assigned to the IoT node and is maintained for the period of ζ, after which time the 
new 𝐼𝑃A is assigned. However, 𝐼𝑃K is kept active for an additional time λ (the thicker 
line), during which time the IoT node is assigned both 𝐼𝑃K and 𝐼𝑃A addresses.  
We now assume that the network introduces delay of 𝑑 to the packet sent from the 
CN. The lower portion of Fig. 2 displays the IP addresses of packets arriving at the 
IoT node. In this example, we assume that the only cause of mis-synchronization of 
the IP addresses is the network delay (i.e., that the clocks are perfectly synchronized). 
We see that the IP addresses of packets arriving at the IoT node follow exactly the IP 
addresses assigned at the IoT node (upper portion of Fig. 2), but they are delayed by 𝑑. In this example, 𝜆 < 𝑑, so some packets arrive at the IoT node after the old IP 
address, 𝐼𝑃K, has already been dropped (after the extra time λ); such packets are lost 
(the loss is marked in darker vertical spaces in the lower portion of Fig. 2). It is easy 
to observe that if 𝜆 > 𝑑, then no packet loss would occur. Next, we present a simple 
analysis of the packet loss. 
Let us consider a long time interval 𝑇 and, for simplicity, assume that 𝑇 is a mul-
tiple of  𝜁; i.e., 𝑇 = 𝑐 ∙ 𝜁, for some integer 𝑐. We further assume that the generation 
rate of packets by the CN is Poisson with rate 𝛾. Since we assume that the only source 
of packet loss is the mismatch in IP addresses (i.e., no network losses), the total arri-
val of packets to the IoT node is also Poisson with rate 𝛾. Then the average packet 
loss is: 
𝐸 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡	  𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = g[ijPklm	  no	  ?npq	  rstSlqp	  ui	  qQl	  uiqlmvs?	  w]g[qnqs?	  ijPklm	  no	  pliq	  rstSlqp	  ui	  qQy	  uiqlmvs?	  w] = g
qnqs?	  ijPklm	  no	  pliq	  rstSlqpui	  qQl	  uiqlmvs?	  w Hg ijPklm	  nomltluvlz	  rstSlqpui	  qQl	  uiqlmvs?	  wg[qnqs?	  ijPklm	  no	  pliq	  rstSyqp	  ui	  qQl	  uiqlmvs?	  w]   
 = {∙t∙|H{∙t∙ |H}~	  (;,zH ){∙t∙| = }~	  (;,zH)	  | = 	  }~	  (;,)|  , (4) 
where we labeled 𝑑 − 𝜆 ≡ 𝐿. Thus, the measure of probability of loss is 𝐿. To mini-
mize the probability of loss, either 𝜆 ≅ 𝑑 or 𝜁 ≫ 𝑑 − 𝜆. The first case requires the 
knowledge of the value of 𝑑, which typically has a non-stationary distribution. Simi-
larly, in the second case, when 𝑑 is large, it requires either large 𝜁 or large 𝜆, leading 
to limiting degree of achievable privacy. In either case, there is a need for a mecha-
nism to estimate the value of 𝑑, which can be measured by a one-way delay meas-
urement scheme. 
3.3   Privacy Protection 
The privacy of the scheme primarily relies on the fact that the sequence of the gener-
ated IP addresses cannot be predicted neither by anyone who does not possess the 
parameters of the Tracking Function, nor by observing the past sequence of the IP 
addresses. To test the temporal randomness of a function the standard method is to 
compute the correlation of the function at various times, i.e., the function’s autocorre-
lation. We conducted experimentation with the hash function we used in our scheme, 
collecting the samples over sufficiently long time to calculate the autocorrelation. The 
experiment showed white-noise like autocorrelation (an impulse 𝛿(𝑥)	  response), 
demonstrating the lack of correlation in the hash function based on chaotic tent maps. 
4   Experimentation Results 
In this section, we provide some results of the experimental implementation of the 
scheme. We used three machines as the main components of the scheme. One ma-
chine served as the IoT node, one as the central node, and one as the CN that commu-
nicated with the IoT node. In order to evaluate the behavior of the basic scheme, we 
experimented with the scheme over a local-area (UTD, in Richardson, TX) network, 
as well as over a wide-area network, where the CN resided at Cornell University, in 
Ithaca, NY. The goal was to understand the performance as a function of different 
settings of the scheme, with drastically different distributions of the network delays. 
The results are summarized in Table 2 (local-area network) and Table 3 (wide-area 
network), for two values of λ=0.3s and λ=0.8s and 𝜁 = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 seconds. 
Table 2.  Packet loss (%) for different values of 𝜁 and 𝜆 (Experiment over local-area network) 
 (a) 𝜆 = 0.3s (b) 𝜆 = 0.8s 𝜁(sec) 1 2 3 4 8  𝜁(sec) 1 2 3 4 8 
Mean 2.22 0.87 0.66 0.39 0.29  Mean 1.20 0.86 0.95 0.80 0.36 
95% CI [1.93,2.51] [0.83,0.9] [0.58,0.73] [0.35,0.42] [0.28,0.3]  95% CI [1,1.39] [0.8,0.93] [0.8,1.07] [0.66,0.92] [0.3,0.41] 
Min 0.18 0.67 0.30 0.17 0.24  Min 0.18 0.29 0.54 0.38 0.21 
Max 4.09 1.16 1.31 0.58 0.37  Max 3.08 1.92 2.11 2.07 0.87 
Table 3.  Packet loss (%) for different values of 𝜁 and 𝜆 (Experiment over wide-area network) 
 (a) 𝜆 = 0.3s (b) 𝜆 = 0.8s 𝜁(sec) 1 2 3 4 8  𝜁(sec) 1 2 3 4 8 
Mean 5.60 1.56 1.37 0.96 0.88  Mean 1.83 0.98 1.30 0.83 0.52 
95% CI [4.68,6.51] [1.43,1.67] [0.45,2.29] [0.04,1.87] [0,1.79]  95% CI [1.67,2] [0.06,1.9] [0.38,2.2] [0,1.74] [0,1.43] 
Min 0.80 0.88 0.27 0.38 0.36  Min 0.61 0.21 0.40 0.37 0.18 
Max 9.98 2.21 3.18 2.14 1.46  Max 2.56 1.57 2.45 1.21 1.02 
 
In our implementation, the IoT node resides in a network of size 256. We used the 
following parameters for the Tracking Function: 𝑙 = 16, 𝑛 = 75, 𝑥 = 8 and (𝑠;, 𝑡;) = (0.10101010, 0.01010101). 
As we can see in Table 2, in local-area networks, for 𝜁 > 2s, the packet loss is 
smaller than 1%. To achieve similar packet loss, in the wide-area network, it is re-
quired that 𝜁 > 4s (Table 3). In the experiment in local-area network, most of the 
losses occur due to delays of running the code, and in particular, due to the delay 
required for changing the IP addresses in a Linux machine.  
 
Fig. 3. Average packet loss (%) for different 𝜁 (sec) 
Fig. 3 shows the average packet loss for a range of values of the parameter 𝜁, 
where 𝜆 = 0.2 ∙ 𝜁. This experiment was done both over the LAN at UTD and also 
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over a WAN (where the CN was at Cornell University). The same parameters for the 
Tracking Function were used as before. The figure demonstrates that there is a 
“threshold” value of 𝜁, below which the packet loss rapidly increase, while above the 
threshold the packet loss remains relatively negligible. Thus, as long as 𝜁 is above the 
threshold, the packet loss is not much sensitive to the actual value of 𝜁. In Fig. 3,  this 
threshold is 𝜁 = 0.7s for the experiment over the local-area network and 𝜁 = 1s for 
experiment over the wide-area network.  
5   Related Work 
There are some related works that use address hopping technique, although either in a 
different manner or for a different reason. Some of these works are primarily related 
to the well-known concept of frequency hopping in wireless networks. The works of 
Shi et al. ([9], [10]) discusses port and address hopping for active cyber defense (gen-
erally DoS). In their work, privacy is not always preserved, as hopping is not done 
continuously. In their more recent work ([11]), they presented a scheme that requires 
Hopping Agent that is responsible for the hopping operation while the security-critical 
server is hidden behind it. Our approach does not require agent and is more suitable 
for IoT scenarios where devices are connected in different settings. 
Another interesting work based on address hopping is Mirage ([12]), which is 
mainly designed for defending against DDoS for web applications. However, the 
scheme cannot be used for privacy preserving in the IoT, since, the scheme is only 
activated when under active attack (and only then, it hops every 5 minutes). Further-
more, it does not match the resource-constrained devices in IoT, as it requires solving 
puzzles, filtering by routers, and sending large size ACL files (few hundred thousand 
entries for small attacks) to routers, on each address change.  
Similarly, a more recent related work based on address hopping by Krylov et al. 
([13]) addressed DDoS attack mitigation. Their system is not scalable to the IoT net-
works, since several routers are required (and should support the scheme) to protect a 
single node. Comparably, the work [14] discusses the general idea of network address 
hopping, but it is not suited for IoT networks, as much information needs to be sent 
between two peers each time a communication needs to be established between two 
nodes. Also their scheme is not scalable to IoT, as the hopping is on per-packet basis 
(only one-to-one communications is supported). In contrast, in our scheme, only the 
scheme’s parameters (i.e., a few numbers) are transmitted when a new CN joins, and 
it supports one-to-many communication, namly suitable for IoT.  
6   Conclusion 
We introduced and discussed a scheme for data privacy in IoT based on IP address 
hopping. The scheme is in particular useful for information privacy protection in a 
scenario where a large number of IoT devices transmit similar monitoring (e.g., te-
lemetry) data. To implement the scheme, we used a hash function based on chaotic 
tent maps as the scheme’s PRNG. We discussed and evaluated some performance 
aspects of the scheme, such as the IP address collisions and the degree of privacy 
protection. In its basic configuration, the scheme requires no changes to the existing 
networking infrastructure. Finally, we provided the results of our experiments with 
the scheme and we showed that there is a fundamental trade-off between achievable 
degree of privacy and the average packet loss. As noted, the scheme could be also 
used for location-privacy and for protection against DoS attacks. We intend to evalu-
ate these directions in our future work. 
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